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NOTES
LIABILITY OF A BALL CLUB TO A SPECTATOR
The plaintiff was in the top row of the right field bleachers
at a baseball park. It was the eighth inning of a close game-
!he first professional baseball game the plaintiff had ever seen.
The home team was one run behind the visiting team. The star
player was at bat for the home team, and the plaintiff had been
in the sun-baked bleachers long enough to absorb the enthusiasm
of his neighbors. "Smack it this way," he shouted, gesticulating
madly. The player did. The ball shot through the air and hit
the plaintiff on the nose.
A suit which was an outgrowth of the above mentioned facts
was heard before the circuit court of the city of St. Louis. The
plaintiff sought a judgment for $7,500, asserting that his nose
had been broken in seven places and that permanent injury had
resulted. His attorney argued that the defendant baseball com-
pany was negligent in not screening the section of the bleachers
where the plaintiff sat. The ball club's attorney argued that the
plaintiff, of his own choice, sat in an unscreened seat. lie re-
viewed testimony to the effect that twelve hundred screened
bleacher seats were unoccupied and that the plaintiff was one of
several men scrambling to'catch the ball. "He went to a sport-
ing event," declared the defendant's attorney. "He was a sport;
he got up where he could see and took a sporting chance. When
he lost he came here."
In the instructions to the jury the court said: "The defend-
ant was not an insurer of plaintiff's safety, but only had to ex-
ercise ordinary care. If you find that plaintiff when he entered
the park chose an unprotected seat, your verdict must be for the
defendant, if you find there were screened seats available, if he
was aware of ball's approach and was attempting to catch same
and permitted himself to be struck, then he cannot recover. It
is instructed that if the plaintiff chose an unprotected seat, al-
though he was struck by a ball, this was one of the ordinary,
usual and natural risks incident to attending a baseball game,
such risk being assumed by him." The jury, after fhearing the
evidence and with the instructions of the court before it, found
for the plaintiff and awarded damages to the extent of $3,500.
LiABiLrry OF A BALL CLUB TO A SPECTATOR
To be sure the case is of more interest than importance inas-
much as it has not been passed upon by an appellate court. Yet
the widespread publicity given the suit may well raise questions
in the minds of laymen as well as in the minds of lawyers as to
the degree of care owed patrons by a ball club management, the
risk assumed by the patrons, and other kindred questions. It is
the purpose of this article to answer such questions and to briefly
criticise the result reached by the trial court in this case.
The case is the more interesting because an appellate court
in the state of Missouri has twice been called to pass upon the
very same questions, where the injury was inflicted by a batted
baseball, and where the facts were otherwise very similar. These
same decisions are probably the most often quoted of any on the
subject.1 The same questions of law were also decided in other
cases which were not, however, baseball cases. 2
In the case of Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition
Co., we find facts almost identical with the facts of the case at
band. The plaintiff, who was no novice at the game of baseball
(note the difference in this respect from the case at hand), volun-
tarily went to the defendant's park to see a game, and, though
he could have taken a protected seat behind wire screening, vol-
untarily seated himself in an unprotected part of the stands (the
bleachers) and was hit by a foul ball and injured. The court
held that the defendant was bound to use reasonable care but
was not an insurer of the plaintiff's safety. The plaintiff was
held to have assumed the risk and was denied damages. The
court quoted from an oft quoted decision of the Supreme Court
of Michigan: "It is knowledge common to all that in these games
hard balls are thrown and batted with great swiftness; that they
are liable to be muffed or batted or thrown outside the lines of
The diamond; and visitors standing in position that may be
reached by such balls have voluntarily placed themselves there
with knowledge of the situation, and may be held to assume the
risk."'3 It is interesting to note than the trial court in this
SCrane v. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App.
301, 153 S. W. 1076 (1913).
Edling v. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition Co., 181 Mo. App.
327, 168 S. W. 908 (1914).
2King v. Ringling, 145 Mo. App. 285, 130 S. W. 482 (1910).
Murrell v. Smith, 152 Mo. App. 95, 133 S. W. 76 (1911).
BZalkely v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118 N. W. 482 (1908).
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Missouri case ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff could
not recover damages and the appellate court sustained the ruling.
In the other baseball case cited the facts were different and.
the plaintiff was given a judgment, but the court discussed the
same problems of law as presented in the preceding case and
approved its holding as to the degree of care owed and the risk
assumed.
Another case, a Minnesota case, which lines up with the
Missouri cases and cites three of them,, is also on all fours with
the case at hand as regards the facts.4 The court, in this case
held that the ball park management was not an insurer of the
patron's safety but was required "to use the care and precau-
tion of the ordinarily prudent person to protect the spectators
against such dangers." It further said, "Persons who know and
appreciate the danger from thrown or batted balls assume the
risk, and they cannot claim the management guilty of negligence
when a choice is given between a seat in the open and one behind
a screen of reasonable extent."
This question very properly arises after a study of the cases
cited: Should not the trial court in the case at hand have di-
rected a verdict for the defendant? We have already noted that
in the case of Crane v. Kansas City Baseball & Exhibition Co.,
the court did this very thing. In that case as in the case at
hand, the plaintiff could have taken a seat behind wire screening
but voluntarily took an unprotected seat. But in that case the
plaintiff was admittedly no novice at the game while in this case
the plaintiff was attending his first professional baseball game.
But does this mean that he had not the required knowledge that
"in these games hard balls are thrown 'and batted with great
swiftness." His conduct at the game, as testified to at the trial,
would indicate that he had this knowledge of the game which is
prerequisite to an assumption of the risks incident to the game.
Yet this difference in the facts of the two cases furnishes a con-
venient loophole to those who would agree with the court in
submitting the case to the jury.
Yet in the case of Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic
Ass'n, the court said: "The court also left it to the jury to say
whether a recovery should be had if the plaintiff was seated out-
Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Assn., 122 Minn. 327,
142 N. W. 706 (1913).
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side the screen (there was a conflict as to whether the plaintiff
was seated inside or outside the screen). Upon this view, we
think it cannot be said as a matter of law that there is no cause
of action." Surely in the case at hand the plaintiff was seated
outside the screen. A Michigan case in which kindred questions
of law are involved went a step further and reversed a decision
of a trial court in which there had been a directed verdict for the
defendant.5 Nevertheless we think the trial court would surely
have been sustained by the Missouri Appellate Court if it had
directed a verdict for the defendant in the ease under considera-
tion.
GEORE RAGLAND, JR.
Scott v. University of Michigan AthZetic Assn., 152 Mich. 684,
116 N. W. 624 (1908).
